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"Years and years and years ago, when I was a boy, when there were
wolves in Wales,"1 when the federal courts were open to plaintiffs and
prisoners for the resolution of constitutional issues,2 before money was
speech,' before closet socialists in the executive branch nationalized all the
government's information and declared it off limits to the citizenry,4
before Gonzo legal journalism cleaned up its act and became Critical Le-
gal Studies,' before it was decreed that pregnancy is gender-neutral,
before the Supreme Court cleared its docket by not hearing argument on
why people should be released from unconstitutional confinement,7 there
were civil liberties and civil rights. Now, the liberties and rights are in
danger. We must do something.
This book sounds the alarm. "Be disturbed," it says, "to the extent of a
tut and I will thank God for civilization."' I cannot fault the motive spirit
t B.A. 1962, J.D. 1966, University of California (Berkeley); Raybourne Thompson Centennial
Professor of Law, University of Texas. I am grateful for comments and suggestions from my col-
leagues Douglas Laycock and Lucas A. Powe, Jr., and from my old friend John Mage.
1. D. THOMAS, A CHILD'S CHI-STMAS IN WALES [no pagination] (1959).
2. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (denying federal habeas review of claim
that conviction was based on coerced confession where constitutional claim was not raised in state
court proceeding) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (federal habeas appropriate for reviewing
conviction based on coerced confession).
3. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), discussed infra Part II.
4. See Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1443, 1461-71
(1984); Censorship and Polygraphs: Hearings on H.R. 4681 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-34 (1984); Federal Polygraph
Limitationand Anti-Censorship Act of 1984, H.R. 98-961, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc.
238 (1984) (banning use and enforcement of prepublication review requirements and restricting use of
polygraph examinations by federal agencies against their employees).
5. Compare H. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING: ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL '72 (1974) with
Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 1 (1984) and Kelman, Trashing, 36
STAN. L. Rav. 293 (1984).
6. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974).
7. See, e.g., Florida v. Myers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1854 (1984) (summary per curiam reversal of
appellate court's reversal of conviction based on warrantless search of impounded vehicle) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), quoted with approval in Remarks of William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme
Court of the United States, Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 1, 1984
(unpublished speech on file with author).
8. C. FRY, THE LADY'S NOT FOR BURNING 13 (1949).
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that produced these essays, for I share the concerns of their authors and
respect them and their contributions to the protection of democratic rights.
How did we get to this situation of danger? One expects a report by the
American Civil Libertites Union, an organization distinguished by its long
history of battling for constitutional rights, to suggest an answer. It barely
manages to address the question. Few of the contributors try to put the
present danger into the perspective of the ACLU's sixty-plus years of ex-
perience, much less into the broader framework of constitutional develop-
ment since the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Whose rights are endangered? Here the authors do better. Some of the
essays are brilliantly conceived, trenchant, and eloquent. The study of
"Sexual Justice" by professors Estrich and Kerr, for example, merits all
these appellations.9 Most of the essays fail, however, to answer this ques-
tion, preferring to cast about in the political currents of Reaganism and
conservative rhetoric to pull out this or that expression of hostility to lib-
erty. There is plenty to catch in those waters, but I shall argue that the
bigger fish are elsewhere.
What is the nature of the danger? After all, the Supreme Court has,
over the past decade, decided a series of cases upholding what the Court
has identified as First Amendment rights against the claims of states and
the federal government. Doesn't this consistent course of decision count for
anything? Not much, when we look at the cases, but essays on "endan-
gered rights" ought to have addressed a different issue: Why are we seeing
a jurisprudence of free speech and press that palters in a double sense,
speaking in First Amendment rhetoric while endorsing the rigging of the
marketplace of ideas?
What should we do about the danger? ACLU executive director Ira
Glasser offers some thoughts,10 and John Shattuck--legislative director of
the ACLU's Washington, D.C. office-reports on civil liberties battles in
the Congress." But Mr. Glasser's prescriptions are too general to serve as
an agenda for action, and Mr. Shattuck ignores the serious criticism of the
ACLU's legislative efforts as too temporizing. This latter criticism from
within and without the organization ought to have been addressed head-
on in this book.
9. Estrich & Kerr, Sexual Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS: THE ACLU REPORT ON
CIVIL LIBERTIES TODAY 98 (N. Dorsen ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS].
10. Glasser, Making Constitutional Rights Work, in OuR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 9,
at 3.
11. Shattuck, Congress and the Legislative Process, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 9,
at 46.
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When reading these essays, I am forcefully reminded of a remark re-
printed in one of Professor Dorsen's earlier works, Frontiers of Civil Lib-
erties,2 which I reviewed in this journal sixteen years ago."3 Caleb Foote
said: "The great stoic philosopher Epictetus in one of his writings
imagined himself facing a wrestler. The strong man boasted to him 'See
my dumbbells,' to which the philosopher impatiently retorted, 'Your
dumbbells are your own affair. I desire to see their effect."" 4 Professor
Foote was talking about the practical effects of sweeping Supreme Court
declarations of rights. His words could as well apply to the effects of
strategies lawyers use in defense of civil liberties.
One hesitates at first to review this book in an academic journal, for the
book does not profess to be "academic." For one thing, it doesn't have
enough footnotes to feed your average law review staff three solid cite-
checking meals a day for even a week. That is no ground for criticism, but
it may help in understanding the difficulty of the reviewer's task. When I
point to places in these essays where doctrinal or historical analysis is
thin, one might respond, "Well, this is not a book for law-trained people;
it is designed to alert and instruct all citizens." Such a retort would not be
responsive: Lawyers wrote this book, mostly about their own work over
the past decade. They have a duty to address the hard questions, if only
because doing so may illuminate some faults in their perception of their
roles.
Some of my concerns arise from comparing this book to the previous
ACLU-sponsored report on civil liberties. In 1971, with Norman Dorsen
as editor, Pantheon published The Rights of Americans.'5 It was a paean
to the Warren Court, an expression of foreboding about the Nixon ad-
ministration's systematic assaults on freedom of expression, and a worried
prediction that the Burger Court would not prove hospitable to claims of
constitutional right. In thirty-one essays, authors-most of them law-
yers-analyzed the progress of rights-protection in as many different
areas. By contrast, this book contains fewer essays on fewer subjects. Pro-
fessor Dorsen introduces the present volume by reminding us that in
1971, the "confident forward march" towards vindicating civil liberties
seemed then "on the verge of disorderly retreat." 6 He had the earlier
volume in hand and mind, so one may permissibly express regret that the
contributors to this volume did not pay more attention to which of the
12. N. DORSEN, FRONTIERS OF CIVIL LIERTIES (1968).
13. Tigar, New Frontiers (Book Review), 78 YALE L.J. 892 (1969).
14. N. DORSEN, supra note 12, at 31, quoted in Tigar, supra note 13, at 894.
15. THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE (N. Dorsen ed.
1971) (hereinafter cited as THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS).
16. Id. at xi. This language also appears in the introduction to OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS,
supra note 9, at ix.
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predictive and analytical utterances in 1971 have proven to be true. After
all, the surest test of a theory-of natural science or of history-is its
power to predict consequences.
My introductory thoughts lead me to adopt a certain format for this
review. I am going to pretend that I had been asked to write the last essay
in the volume, a sort of envoi, or if you prefer, antistrophe. I want to look
back over these essays, to gain a perspective on what they fail to tell us.
I. THE LEGACY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND ANTIWAR MOVEMENTS
Several of the authors look back two decades and remind us of the civil
rights and antiwar movements, and of the judicial decisions occasioned by
these movements. Professor Neuborne tells us, in a couple of paragraphs,
that the Supreme Court has cut back on dissenter access to federal
courts. I1 None of these essays does justice to this theme. Yet in The Rights
of Americans, many authors speculated on just how far the federal courts
had really gone in remaking the rules about federal judicial power, and
whether we were about to witness a major retrenchment."'
The retrenchment has come, and we had best understand it. The civil
rights and free speech cases of the 1950's and 1960's were remarkable
because they represented a new vision of federalism, of judicial power,
and of the meaning of the Civil War amendments. Almost every expansive
Supreme Court opinion on these topics broke new ground on all of these
fronts, provided only that the party claiming a federal right was somehow
involved in the historic struggle to vindicate the promise of Brown v.
Board of Education.9 At the same time, it must be noted, claimants with-
out such an involvement did not uniformly fare well against the competing
claims of coordinate branches of the federal government or of the states.
I consider the proper starting point of this analysis to be Dombrowski v.
Pfister,2 ° decided in 1965. Dombrowski was discussed in The Rights of
Americans,2" but not in this volume. The facts are worth recalling. Jim
Dombrowski was executive director of the Southern Conference Educa-
tional Fund (SCEF). The Louisiana Un-American Activities Committee
organized raids, carried out at gunpoint, on the SCEF offices and the
homes and law offices of SCEF leaders.22 Dombrowski, SCEF, and others
17. Neuborne, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Process, in OuR ENDANGERED RIGHTS,
supra note 9, at 33-35.
18. E.g., Dorsen, Introduction, THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, supra note 15, at xi; Boudin, The
Right to Travel, in id., at 381, 395-96; Emerson, The Right to Protest, in id., at 208, 212.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
20. 380 U.S. 479 (1965), rev'g 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964) (three-judge court).
21. THE RIGErs OF AMERICANS, supra note 15, at 219-20.
22. These raids were much in the mold of the general search condemned in Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476 (1965). The ransack search of Stanford's home was done under a warrant obtained from
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sued to restrain this sort of conduct, to get back their papers and books,
and to inhibit the state authorities from prosecuting them under the Loui-
siana version of the Smith Act and Communist Control Act.23 SCEF and
its officers also sued to prevent the Louisiana authorities from transferring
the seized records to Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, who had sub-
poenaed them for use by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. 24 Af-
ter much skirmishing, the three-judge district court convened to hear the
constitutional challenge to the Louisiana sedition laws, upheld the laws on
their face, and refused to hear evidence on the laws' illegal application.
Justice Brennan, writing for five Justices (Harlan and Clark dissent-
ing, Black and Stewart not sitting) held the challenged provisions of the
Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Laws unconstitu-
tional on their face as overbroad and vague, and remanded the case to the
district court to fashion a decree.25 As for abstention, the Court did not
tarry long, for deference to a state court by waiting for it to construe a
statute in the first instance is silly when the statute is unconstitutional on
any reading.
a state district judge who ordinarily heard only civil matters. The prosecutors told the judge that
neither of the two regular criminal district judges was available to issue the warrant. This was false,
as both of them were in their chambers all that afternoon. Neither of these two judges would have
issued the warrant. I owe this bit of history to John F. Onion, Jr., one of the two criminal district
judges involved, and now Presiding Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
23. While the lawsuit was pending, some of the plaintiffs were indicted under these sedition acts,
although they would not have been if Judge Wisdom's restraining order had not been-wrongly, the
Supreme Court later said-dissolved.
24. This aspect of the litigation was mooted by transfer of the records from Louisiana to Missis-
sippi at Eastland's direction, apparently while the lawsuit was pending. My information about the
chronology of events is taken largely from 9 Civ. LIBERTIES DOCKET 12-13 (1963); 9 id. at 88-89
(1964); 10 id. at 30-31 (1964); 10 id. at 104 (1965). The Docket is an invaluable resource in revisit-
ing the times of which I am writing. See also A. KiNoy, RIGrS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A
PEOPLE'S LAWYER (1983) (autobiography of leading participant in these struggles).
25. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 497-98, 496 n.13. The decree was to uphold most of the rest of the
appellants' claims while addressing, without abstention, the remaining issues in the case. The district
judge having dismissed the complaint, the matter was heard in the Supreme Court on the appellants'
allegations, as supplemented by facts otherwise appearing in the record and conceded by the State.
The Court overcame three objections to its decision: the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982); the restraint on a court of equity interfering with a criminal prosecution; and the abstention
doctrine. The Anti-Injunction Act bars judicial interference with pending state proceedings, and there
was no criminal case pending when appellants' complaint was filed.
The equitable principle of noninterference rests upon the theory that a criminal defendant has an
adequate remedy at law, by raising the constitutional claim in the criminal case. See C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS § 52A, at 321 (4th ed. 1983). Ultimately, he will have a federal forum in which to
air the claim, whether by discretionary review on certiorari or by federal habeas corpus. (I intend here
to express, though not to defend at length, a view that federal habeas to review confinement in viola-
tion of a federal right is constitutionally mandated. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 348-60
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Ques-
tion Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. Rav. 1135, 1173-78 (1970).) Dombrowski and
his friends, however, were inhibited in their protected activity by the mere threat of a prosecution
under these invalid statutes, and their claim that prospective members and supporters would be scared
off was not difficult to credit.
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Dombrowski, as one of its wisest critics has put it, led "many litigants"
to discern "a major change in federal-state relations."26 These litigants
were doomed to disappointment when in 197127 the Court began a retreat
from Dombrowski that continues to this day. 8 Professor Neuborne should
not have forgotten Dombrowski, particularly as he was describing the
Court's increasingly restrictive philosophy of judicial review. In the great
debates over the function and power of the Court, Dombrowski is a decla-
ration that the Court can decide something important, and that overcom-
ing purported barriers to deciding is not a matter of unprincipled discre-
tion but of closely-argued principle arrayed in the informing light of social
conditions.29
Many of the lawyers who in 1965 believed in progressive social change
failed to understand why Dombrowski was decided as it was, and there-
fore went about filing lawsuits that exposed what was narrow and weak
about the principles it announced.30 I cannot think this was any fault of
Justice Brennan, who was quite aware of the historical setting in which
he wrote the majority opinion and could expect his auditors to understand
both what he was saying and why he could get the votes to say it.
The historical setting of Dombrowski instructs us about the conditions
that produce judicial willingness to assert power. 1 Between the filing of
the Dombrowski appellants' jurisdictional statement in early spring of
1964 and oral argument in January of 1965, the nation had witnessed
Freedom Summer-a concentrated effort by civil rights organizations in
Mississippi to reform educational opportunities for blacks, register black
voters, and unseat the regular Mississippi Democrats at the Democratic
Party convention in Atlantic City. During that summer in Mississippi,
three civil rights workers were murdered by Klan agents, four were shot
and wounded, fifty-two beaten severely enough to warrant reports to the
authorities. Two hundred and fifty civil rights workers were arrested by
Mississippi authorities. Thirteeen Black churches were burned to the
26. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 52A, at 322.
27. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
28. There is a rich and extensive scholarly debate over the meaning of Dombrowski. Everybody's
favorite is or ought to be Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977). Douglas Laycock has contrib-
uted an important work in Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dom-
browski Forgot, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 636 (1979). Other commentaries are cited in C. WRIGHT, supra
note 25, at 320 n.1.
29. See generally Tigar, supra note 25 (arguing against an evanescent "political question" barrier
to decision).
30. There is some discussion of this point in C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 322; see also A.
KINOY, supra note 24, at 209-55.
31. Close attention to the constraints of legal ideology is the hallmark of careful judging and an
indicium of conscious effort to legitimate a decision by placing it in the context of precedent. Progres-
sive judges and lawyers add to this technical skill a firm appreciation of where the law "must go" if it
is to redeem the dominant ideology's promises of freedom and fairness. See M. TIGER, LAW AND THE
RIsE OF CAPITALISM 20-23 (1977).
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ground. Seventeen other buildings used by civil rights groups were dam-
aged by arson fires or bombs. Ten automobiles were damaged or de-
stroyed, and there were an additional seven bombings that resulted in no
property damage or injury. 2
The murders, and the struggles at the 1964 Democratic convention,
dramatized the events of that summer in Mississippi. But these events
were neither unprecedented nor localized. Leafing through the pages of
the Race Relations Law Reporter and the Civil Liberties Docket for 1963
through 1965"s freshens one's recollection. In Danville, Virginia, the sum-
mer of 1963 had seen more than 1000 arrests of demonstrators seeking
desegregation and equal job opportunities.34 From 1961 to the summer of
1963, the civil rights movement in Southwest Georgia, centered in Albany,
withstood a like number of arrests. 5 As the Fifth Circuit found in Bush
v. Orleans Parish School Board,8 and as Judge Wisdom repeated in dis-
sent from the district court's decision in Dombrowski, the State "mar-
shalled the full force of its criminal law to enforce its social philosophy
through the policeman's club."13 7
In sum, the officers of government of the former Confederacy-in the
police, municipalities, courts, legislatures, and executive offices-were ille-
gitimate in every juridical sense save only that concerned with their par-
ents' marital status. Despite the unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,8 and the dozens of decrees applying its teaching to particular
school systems, 9 segregation of public education was still the rule. Black
voters were systematically disenfranchised, and when the overtly racist
registration statutes fell before the first wave of civil rights suits, new and
ostensibly neutral barriers were erected.40 These barriers in turn were
attacked, with consequent delay in admitting blacks to the political pro-
cess. Judge Wisdom, this time writing for a majority of a three-judge
court, arraigned the voter registration system of Louisiana in an eloquent
opinion richly detailed in its understanding of Louisiana history. Of the
32. N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1964, at Al, col. 2. For much of the factual information that follows, I
have referred to the Civil Liberties Docket, the Race Relations Law Reporter, and the scripts of my
weekly radio program, Mississippi Report, aired over Pacifica Radio stations in the summer of 1964.
33. Race Relations Law Reporter was published by Vanderbilt Law School during this period.
34. 8 Civ. LIBERTIEs DOCKET 124-25 (1963).
35. Id. at 125.
36. 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961), affd sub nom. Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11
(1962).
37. 227 F. Supp. at 581 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (quoting Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board,
194 F. Supp. 182, 186 (1961)).
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
39. These cases are collected in the issues of the Civil Liberties Docket and Race Relations Law
Reporter for this period.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff d, 380 U.S. 145
(1965) (striking down ostensibly neutral voter registration provisions).
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Louisiana registration statute, he wrote: "A wall stands in Louisiana be-
tween registered voters and unregistered, eligible Negro voters. . . . We
hold: this wall, built to bar Negroes from access to the franchise, must
come down.""' Thus begins forty-three pages in the Federal Supplement
surveying the history of Louisiana voter law and demolishing barriers to
the exercise of federal equity power. The opinion was written in Novem-
ber 1963, and the Supreme Court affirmed in the same term as
Dombrowski.4 2 Of course, even had many blacks then registered, the
promise of fair representation contained in Baker v. Carr43 and its prog-
eny would not soon be redeemed.
The compelling force of these facts led the great judges of the
South-Wisdom, Tuttle, Rives, Johnson, Wright, and others-to their
often-repeated conclusion that federal equity power was virtually the only
constitutionally-based authority in the former Confederacy. In the service
of this conclusion, these judges sought majorities for broad propositions
about judicial power."" As Judge Wisdom wrote:
"States' Rights" are mystical, emotion-laden words. For me, as for
most Southerners, the words evoke visions of the hearth and defense
of the homeland and carry the sound of bugles and the beat of
drums. But the crowning glory of American federalism is not States'
Rights. It is the protection the United States Constitution gives to the
private citizen against all wrongful governmental invasion of funda-
mental rights and freedoms.45
When I say that the federal equity power was virtually the only legiti-
mate authority in the South, I have in mind the desultory performance of
the executive branch, even as late as the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Sum-
mer. Attorney General Kennedy, as his most able biographer has shown,
had no civil rights program and tended to respond to the growing crisis in
the South as a series of isolated events, each of which could be "handled"
by the Camelot team.46 Two striking examples deserve mention. When
41. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 355-56.
42. 380 U.S. 145 (1965); see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (challenge to
voting prerequisites embodied in new constitution with registrars and election commissioners named
as defendants constituted proper cause of action), rev'g 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
43. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
44. I have already set out some of these; others included holdings about the scope and meaning of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. For a sweeping example of federal injunctive proceeding, see
United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 10 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1449 (E.D. La. 1965);
see also 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2956, at 566 & nn.99, I
(appealability of denials of injunctive relief by federal district judges); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369
(5th Cir. 1964) (degree of deference due state rules).
45. Dombrowski, 227 F. Supp. at 570 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
46. V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 96-155 (1970). I reviewed this book shortly after it ap-
peared, and looking back I think I was too critical of Navasky's work. I apologize to him for that;
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three civil rights workers disappeared on a trip within Mississippi to in-
vestigate the burning of a Black church, Attorney General Kennedy was
reported in the press as having said the federal government lacks power to
take "preventive police action" in Mississippi (or, presumably, elsewhere
in the South) to aid Black citizens seeking to exercise the rights of citizen-
ship. His words brought forth a letter, signed by five members of the
Harvard law faculty (Bator, Countryman, Fried, Howe, and Mansfield)
terming Kennedy's remark a "facile pronouncement" and pointing to stat-
utes dating nearly to the dawn of the Republic that gave the executive
branch precisely such power.47 The second telling episode was the Demo-
cratic party's unedifying compromise with the racist and segregationist
Democrats of Mississippi at the 1964 convention in Atlantic City.48
Despite calls from members of Congress, however, the Administration
intervened only gradually in the South, never becoming a full partner
with the courageous and overburdened federal judges. The consequences
of inaction included the burnings, bombings, beatings, and deaths. For the
civil rights leaders and their lawyers, executive inaction heightened a per-
ceived need for broad equitable relief.
Of the many observations about Dombrowski prompted by this history,
I would single out one: Professor Owen Fiss ended his article on
Dombrowski by saying, "It is an authoritative reminder of a judicial era
that was and that could be."49 Judge J. Skelly Wright quoted those words
in introducing Justice Brennan at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference in
May 1984.50 They carry the key to Dombrowski's central meaning. The
"judicial era" of Dombrowski "was" because courageous judges perceived
an imperative need for federal judicial intervention. Dombrowski was
faithful to the course of decision from Brown in 1954 to 1966, a time
when the Court began at last to redeem the promise of the Civil War
amendments;5" it also acknowledged that the movement contending for
rights needed at least as much protection as the rights themselves. When,
on February 1, 1960, the civil rights movement-in the hands of a new
generation-burst out of the courthouses and entered a new phase of di-
rect action, 52 the Court's decisions kept pace while the overworked judges
since he is a Yale Law School graduate, this apology belongs in these pages.
47. A copy of the professors' letter is in my Mississipi Report file.
48. See, e.g., A. KINoY, supra note 24, at 257-96.
49. Fiss, supra note 28, at 1164.
50. A copy of text, furnished by Judge Wright, is on file with author.
51. See generally Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERs L. REV. 387
(1967) (discussing failure to define substantive rights created by the wartime amendments, and na-
tional duty to do so).
52. The first sit-in was February 1, 1960. See NATIONAL ADVISORY CONIMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERs, REPORT 226-28 (Bantam ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT].
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of the Fifth Circuit filled up the interstices with decisions striking at every
manner of state interference.
In a string of cases that included Edwards,5" Lombard,5" Hamm,5"
Barr,5" Gibson,57 Bates,58 Button, 9 and Bouie,0 the Court recognized
that defense of the principles of Brown and its progeny required defense
of Black self-organization. These cases not only announced results and
rules, but implicitly conceded that in the long run the federal courts could
not do this job alone. Seen in this context, Dombrowski announced a rule
that was as exceptional as the situation it confronted. And one need not
have been surprised that in other, less demanding, contexts, a majority of
Justices could not be summoned to approve a like interference with state
procedures for adjudicating claims, or a like skepticism towards the claims
of red-baiters. For example, the Court in 1961 had affirmed by a narrow
majority the contempt of Congress conviction of SCEF leader Carl Braden
for refusing to answer questions concerning anti-House Committee on
Un-American Activities organizing."- I say that the Court's constancy in
defense of Brown endured from 1954 to 1966. Already by 1964, the ma-
jority had begun to waver. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill82 set aside sit-in
trespass convictions by a vote of 5 to 4. The basis for Justice Clark's
opinion was that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had abated the prosecu-
tions. This opinion suggested that the occasion for taking to the street was
now sharply reduced, given the availability of federal civil remedies for
discrimination.
In 1966, it was 5 to 4 the other way, as the Court "stepped back" in
Adderley v. Floridas and, through Justice Black, affirmed trespass con-
victions that arose from a sit-in at a jail to protest alleged unlawful arrests
of civil rights activists. Justice Black rejected claims that the state trespass
statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. His opinion rests
upon the premises that a jail, unlike a park, is not an appropriate or
natural place for protest, and that these demonstrators had not shown that
the state had in the past tolerated demonstrations at this jail. The opinion
defers in great measure to the facts as impliedly found by the jury, and to
53. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). I know my list is selective. For a broader,
deeper view, see H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
54. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
55. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
56. Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
57. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
58. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
59. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
60. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
61. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
62. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
63. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The phrase is taken from the title of Kipperman, Civil Rights at Arma-
geddon-The Supreme Court Steps Back: Adderley v. Florida, 3 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 219 (1966).
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the evidence offered by the state's witnesses. This deference is in marked
contrast to the independent factfinding characteristic of the court's ear-
lier-and later-First Amendment cases. Justice Douglas, writing in dis-
sent for himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan and Fortas,
pointed out that jails have traditionally symbolized arbitrary power, and
mentioned the Tower of London and the Bastille."'
The Adderley majority's deference to the state's statute, judicial process,
and law enforcement officers, and Justice Black's 1971 majority opinion
in Younger v. Harris"5 each rest on premises that undercut the language,
if not the central meaning, of Dombrowski. Looking from Adderley to
Younger, the events that spawned this new-found deference to the state
police, courts and legislatures in First Amendment cases are easy to iden-
tify. Racial unrest had led to disorder in the cities and on the campuses of
the North.16 Justice Fortas had penned a pamphlet, Concerning Dissent
and Civil Disobedience,'7 whose thesis could only with difficulty be rec-
onciled with his own opinion for a narrow majority in Brown v. Louisi-
ana,68 reversing trespass convictions arising from a library sit-in, or with
his dissent in Adderley. So, despite the findings of a distinguished commis-
sion in 1968 that American society-North and South-was pervaded
with white racism 9 fifteen years after Brown v. Board of Education, the
Court's majority began to recede from the territory it had staked out
before 1966. This limited retreat, marked by deep concern with the tactics
of some civil rights activists, took place at a time when the civil rights
movement itself was riven with controversy over issues of violence, disobe-
dience to law, and the prospect of continued black-white cooperation. The
antiwar movement rose, and in its turn faced like disputes.
Both to those who saw the turmoil as a harbinger of necessary change,
and to those who saw it as an inequity that could not possibly be justified,
William Butler Yeats' words must have seemed apt:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold.70
Some in the center did not abandon their posts: Brennan, Marshall,
64. 385 U.S. at 49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
65. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
66. See Tigar, supra note 13, at 898-901; Symposium, Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1966).
67. A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968). See also Tigar, Book
Review, 67 MICH. L. REv. 612 (1969) (reviewing Fortas' book).
68. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). See Tigar, supra note 67, at 614.
69. KERNER REPORT, supra note 52, passim.
70. W. YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 184-85 (1977).
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Douglas, and Skelly Wright spring to mind. But the profound alteration
in perceptions of protest and protesters strengthened the hand of the right,
and counseled its adherents to regard Dombrowski not as the redemption
of a constitutional promise about federalism, but as an extraordinary re-
sponse to an exceptional and concluded episode. It was not a case of judi-
cial exhaustion, that "too long a sacrifice can make a stone of the heart." 71
Those who turned away from liberty had been at best its summer soldiers.
The lawyers whose work had brought Dombrowski to the Court failed,
in some measure, to see this change coming. Regarding Dombrowski as the
herald of a newly-defined federal equitable jurisdiction, they brought af-
firmative suits in great numbers. These cases mostly foundered .7  They
were perhaps unwise in concept, for they sought to combine the attitude of
the early affirmative cases brought in the wake of Brown with a confident
certainty that Dombrowski would be read for all that it might mean. The
lawyers minimized the important consideration that Dombrowski was
brought to defend a vital, insistent movement under attack, and not to
define and lead a movement. I do not argue that these lawyers were re-
sponsible for choking off the applicability of Dombrowski through system-
atic overuse: Rather, they were too confident that most federal judges
could survive the shocks of the late 1960's and still pursue the goal of
defending the protest and dissent that many began to perceive as imperil-
ing established order.
The lesson of Dombrowski then was and now is that while movements
for change will often find courts more congenial allies than police or legis-
latures or Presidents, this will by no means always be true. The Supreme
Court's willingness to uphold protest when all other political institutions
are seeking to put it down is exceptional in our constitutional history, as
the World War I prosecutions 73 and most of the McCarthy-era cases74
bear out. True, even a relatively conservative Court will respond to genu-
ine constitutional crisis by upholding its own authority: Witness the unan-
imous decision that President Nixon had to surrender the tapes. 75 Most
often, however, the Court has done its great constitutional work in tacit
71. W. YEATS, Easter 1916, in id. at 179.
72. These suits sought every kind of result from receiverships over public institutions to injunc-
tions against prosecutions under laws enforced by states whose policies had not been sullied by the
consistent course of conduct that marked the Southern authorities. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, §
52A, at 322-23. I recall the debates at the time over the use of what some perceived as the wonder-
working power of Dombrowski. Nothing I say here is intended to cast aspersions on Arthur Kinoy,
who argued Dombrowski in the Court. Arthur and I have disagreed at times over the years, but I
remain an unstinting admirer.
73. See T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DoRsFN, 1 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 50-54 (4th ed. 1976).
74. The low-water mark, bringing all the McCarthyite cliches together, is Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (upholding registration order).
75. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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recognition of significant political forces. These forces need not be majori-
ties, but they must at least command support among those with important
roles in defining the dominant legal ideology of a particular time.
For the Dombrowski majority, "federalism" and "separation of powers"
were not simply words but articles of faith in the fundamental rightness of
American institutions, and in the ability of these institutions to accommo-
date all legitimate demands for change. The wave of federal judicial inter-
vention could not, even by the principles invoked in Dombrowski, carry
forward for very long. And when it receded, it would be up to the other
branches or an organized citizenry to occupy the terrain over which it had
washed.
This analysis suggests that the authors of this collection of essays might
profitably have joined the debate over judicial review, and asked where we
can expect to see a developing consensus for support of democratic rights.
The authors might have asked whether, given the prediction in The
Rights of Americans of a shift in the Court's attitude toward federal judi-
cial power, some civil libertarian resources were misdirected in the decade
just past. Perhaps civil libertarians should have pressed more for favorable
interpretations of state constitutions, which state courts are free to con-
strue as conferring more protection than the federal Constitution. 6 In any
case, these essays do not seek, as they ought to have done, to understand
and interpret the Court's retreat from article III.
One might also ask, as some have, whether Dombrowski carried its own
seeds of destruction, because it conceded too much or because it overlooked
significant precedent that might have made its rationale more intelligible
and enduring. Professors Fiss" and Laycock, 7  among others, have illumi-
nated this difficult question, and surely some of the authors of these essays
76. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state may provide more
expansive individual liberties in its constitution, not inconsistent with those conferred by federal Con-
stitution); remarks of Justice Brennan supra note 7; remarks of Judge Wright, supra note 50.
77. Fiss, supra note 28, passim.
78. Laycock, supra note 28. Professor Laycock's brilliant article on the precedents that Justice
Brennan failed to cite in Dombrowski provokes this additional observation. Laycock notes, quite
rightly, that Dombrowski's defense of federal equitable power could have rested firmly upon dozens of
cases holding federal equitable relief "generally available without regard to the plaintiff's substantive
constitutional theory." Id. at 659. Professor Fiss, he argues, was wrong in saying that Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), had closed the doors of the federal courts save in exceptional cases.
See Fiss, supra note 28, at 1106-14.
This question was discussed in the majority opinion for the three-judge court in Dombrowski, 227
F. Supp. at 560. The court cited cases decided before and after Douglas, misconstrued several of
them, and found them all unpersuasive. Most of the cases, Judge Ellis pointed out, involved injunc-
tions against economic regulation statutes. "None of the cases," he noted, "involved so fundamental an
element of state sovereignty as that of self-preservation." Id. at 560 n.1. Nevertheless, Judge Ellis'
analysis stood the First Amendment on its head, since the "self-preservation" of which he spoke was
to be guaranteed by an arguably overbroad statute being invoked on an allegedly improper basis.
Thus, the entire line of authority of which Professor Laycock speaks was not exactly forgotten, for
some of it was in the lower court opinion. After all, to have rested upon the pre-Douglas cases would
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should have troubled to discover the provenance of the hostility that has
undercut some-though by no means all-of Dombrowski's power. I have
suggested the beginnings of an analysis. Dombrowski champions the First
Amendment and reacts to the specific historical conditions to which I have
referred. It reminds us of an era that "was" and "can be" because its
promise will likely be redeemed only when a movement for change again
confronts consistent and implacably lawless hostility, and when judges are
willing to perceive what is happening and to act.
There is additional support for this view in the Court's treatment of the
Selective Service cases during the Vietnam War, as well as in the eventual
reaction of the lower federal courts to the evident unfairness of the con-
scription system and to the upsurge of deliberate defiance of that system's
commands. 9 The Court, while refusing to confront the issue of the War's
legality under international and domestic law,80 and while refusing pre-
induction judicial review in one important case,81 upheld most registrant
challenges in a series of significant decisions. These decisions, although
addressing the draft, relied upon a principled theory of judicial review and
commanded the votes even of those who were later to join the majority in
Younger and its progeny.82 In the lower federal courts, the hostility to
Selective Service overreaching was even more apparent, as median
sentences and conviction rates steadily declined and as judicial opinions
insisted more and more sharply that the System obey its own rules and
honor constitutional commands.
Recent judicial enforcement of the registration requirement 3 does not
call this analysis into question: Judicial review of conscription decisions
has been limited in ways that the late 1960's and early 1970's cases did
have validated a judicial role for the Court inconsistent with a presumption of noninterference in state
social legislation. This perhaps Justice Brennan himself was unwilling to do, given his own view of
federalism. Moreover, it is not surprising to see deference to the criminal process, whether of a state
or the federal government. The restrictions on interlocutory review and on the use of extraordinary
writs testify to that. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967) (extraordinary writs); DiBella v.
United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962) (interlocutory review).
79. For details about this period, including the statistics on the number of prosecutions and the
declining rate of convictions and declining median sentence, see the issues of the Selective Service Law
Reporter.
80. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935 (1967) (Stewart & Douglas, JJ., separately
dissenting from denial of cert.).
81. Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968).
82, I have in mind Breen v. Selective Service Board, 396 U.S. 460 (1970) (preventing delinquent
induction of student protester who had obtained valid deferment); Gutknecht v. United States, 396
U.S. 295 (1970) (unanimous decision-though different justices had different rationales-striking
down delinquency regulations); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 192-201 (1969) (excusing
failure to exhaust administrative remedies). See generally Symposium, Selective Service 1970, 17
UCLA L. REv. 893 (1970). But see Asimow, Introduction, 17 UCLA L. REv. 893, 898 (1970) (in
protecting registrants court offered "muddy and confusing" rationale for judicial review).
83. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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not undermine, and that make the recent decisions unsurprising, if disap-
pointing.84 More importantly, there has not yet been the great public out-
cry over registration that arose during the Vietnam War. If this analysis
is correct, then a study of judicial power in the abstract, or as a matter of
the structure of the constitution, does not tell us about the tasks ahead for
those who wish to protect and extend democratic rights. We ought to be
asking, among other questions, from whence may come the next great
movement that will underscore the need for democratic rights and vivify
the claims that they be enforced.
Who built the seven gates of Thebes?
The books are filled with the names of kings
Was it kings who hauled the craggy blocks of stone?85
It may be that when such a time comes, the institutions of judicial
power will have been so far corrupted and will have committed themselves
so deeply to defending power and privilege that the era that "was" cannot
then be. That is a question one might profitably raise, but raising it goes
beyond a review of the book I am discussing.
II. WHAT HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE FORUM?
I would have expected these essays to discuss in some detail the course
of free speech doctrine this past decade. Morton Halperin's article86 con-
tains some enlightening comments on national security, and Professor
Emerson's essay87 contributes greatly to understanding the academic free-
dom precedents. But the Supreme Court has, during this decade, decided a
torrent of free speech cases, and these are not addressed. The Court's deci-
sions have markedly changed the dominant themes of First Amendment
analysis in ways that should concern civil libertarians.
In the 1930's, the Mexican artist Diego Rivera was commissioned to do
murals on the interior walls of Rockefeller Center. In one scene, he por-
trayed Lenin. John D.'s grandson Nelson was displeased. As E. B. White
told the story, Nelson said:
"And though your art I dislike to hamper
I owe a little to God and Gramper,
84. Judicial review of Selective Service decisions must usually await the completion of the regis-
trant's processing, his call to service, and his refusal to take the symbolic step forward signifying entry
into the armed forces. See Practice Manual, SEL. SaRv. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) §§ 2454,
2501-2502 (1972).
85. B. BRECHT, A Worker Reads History, in SELECTED POEMS 109 (H. Hays trans. 1947).
86. Halperin, National Security, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 281.
87. Emerson, Academic Freedom, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 179.
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And after all,
It's my wall . .
"We'll see if it is," said Rivera."'
Beginning in the late 1930's, the Court, at the urging of labor or-
ganizers and religious colporteurs, 9 began to take seriously the need for
public communication even of unpopular views. The history is familiar.
Jersey City's Mayor Hague had said to the CIO, "After all, it's my
street." We'll see if it is, said the CIO, and Justice Roberts wrote for the
Court that title did not give the municipality the right to restrict the his-
toric use of public places for free expression."0 The company town of
Chickasaw, Alabama, was declared in Marsh v. Alabama9 to look
enough like a normal city to require First Amendment protection for Je-
hovah's Witnesses seeking to enter and proselytize. In another case, the
expressive component of picketing was held to be a First Amendment
activity.92
We need to recall these cases because the Burger Court has developed a
free speech jurisprudence that rests upon different premises and tilts the
balance away from the dissident speaker with limited resources and an
unpopular message and in favor of those who are able to say: It's my wall.
We can see this development begin in the campaign finance cases. Be-
ginning with Buckley v. Valeo,9' the Court invalidated restrictions on the
amount of money individuals could spend in support of their own candi-
dacies. The federal statute at issue, passed in the wake of Watergate, os-
tensibly regulated money and sought to limit the public impact of wealthy
candidates engaging in speech through purchased access to the mass me-
dia. These limitations had been enacted with the Rockefellers-and the
Kennedys-in mind.94 The Court held that, after all, it is Nelson's
money, and that for these purposes anyway, money is speech.
In First National Bank v. Bellotti,9 5 the Court struck down a Massa-
chusetts statute that, like the laws of some thirty-one states, restricted
88. White, I Paint What I See, in A NEW ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN PoETRY 232, 233 (1946).
89. A "colporteur" is as different from a "Cole Porter" as "Amazing Grace" is from "Boola
Boola."
90. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
91. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946).
92. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-05 (1940). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) (wise and extensive treatment of First Amendment cases).
93. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
94. Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 243, 251. I have
learned a lot from reading this article, although Professor Powe would add, "Not nearly enough."
95. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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business corporations from spending money to influence voters on any is-
sue except one materially affecting the business or property of the corpo-
ration. The statute interfered with the "free flow of . . .information,"
wrote Justice Powell for six members of the Court.96 Justice White dis-
sented, for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, noting the "'dele-
terious influences . . . resulting from the use of money by those who ex-
ercise control over large aggregations of capital.' 9 7 The dissent also
pointed out that management could not even say it was their money; the
corporation's assets belong, in some sense, to the shareholders-all of
whom were subsidizing this corporate message despite their individual
views on the subject.9"
When the ACLU last reported to us in 1971, the Court had built upon
Marsh v. Alabama99 and held in Logan Valley'00 that a shopping center
that looked like a downtown business district was, at least for picketing
related to the center's business, a proper place for the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
Logan Valley noted that the modern shopping center was absorbing an
ever-greater percentage of retail trade, and was therefore appropriate to
the exercise of First Amendment rights.101 It recognized that direct control
by property owners of what had been areas suited for public discourse
required a new mode of analysis. By rejecting the owners' claim that "it's
our wall," the decision protected those of limited means, whose communi-
cation efforts are limited to walking, handbilling, and talking to small
groups of citizens. Logan Valley was a common-sense application of Jus-
tice Roberts' conclusion in Hague0 2 that abstract ideas of title are not
dispositive of First Amendment issues.
Logan Valley did not live long; it was limited to its facts in 1972 by
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner,'0 3 and then overruled in 1976 in Hudgens
v. NLRB.10 4 Denizens of the suburbs were now insulated from speech,
save that sponsored by those who could afford to beam it into their living
rooms and pay to have it put in their daily papers or their mailboxes. The
96. Id. at 783 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 812 (citations omitted).
98. Interestingly, when the captive contributors were those who pay union dues under a union
shop arrangement, the Court held the captivity issue forbade similar expenditures. These differences
between these two types of cases, including the presence of federal legislation and an arguable addi-
tional element of compulsion in the union shop dues payment setting, do not obviously justify the
Court's different approaches toward them. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36
(1977).
99. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
100. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
101. 391 U.S. at 324-25.
102. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
103. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
104. 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
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Court has since that time limited access on a variety of grounds to various
expressive activities in places to which even public agencies hold title.'
Hudgens reflected an attitude that swept more broadly than its First
Amendment impact: an increased deference to nominal privateness for
purposes of "state action" or "federal action."" 6 One major element of the
civil rights litigation of the 1960's had been to look behind the form in
which property was held in order to determine whether an entity was
bound to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 7 Hudgens affirms
the same principles of insulation from constitutional obligation as the
Court began to apply in cases involving racial discrimination and due pro-
cess of law.
In a provocative article in The Supreme Court Review, Professor Powe
has focused upon a somewhat different group of cases, but his able analy-
sis confirms that the Court's majority has decided that money is speech.'0 8
I would add that lack of money may permissibly mean no speech, or high-
ly restricted opportunity to engage in speech. Not First Ameildment ideol-
ogy, but the myth of the free market, drives these cases. A volume devoted
to telling us why and how our rights are endangered, and containing at
least some recognition of the relationship between economic well-being
and rights,0 9 should have commented critically upon the powerful and
increasing acceptance of monopoly forces in the marketplace of ideas.
The constitutionalization of any rule tends to set that rule beyond sub-
stantial and immediate tinkering. The constitutional jurisprudence of the
past decade evokes images of Lochner v. New York." ° The Court is erect-
ing, by invoking the First Amendment and curtailing the reach of earlier
state action cases, a constitutionally defined zone of immunity for wealth
and the privileges of wealth. This trend is reversible: Indeed, identifying
and commenting upon it is the first step towards doing something about it.
For example, the Court has firmly said that the states are free to interpret
their own constitutions as requiring access to places such as shopping cen-
ters for the exercise of First Amendment rights."' The federalist vision of
105. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). The
owners of shopping malls are a promising market for communicators, but mostly for those with com-
mercial messages designed to attract shoppers. An airline magazine tells about a shopping mall pro-
motional stunt involving an elephant who became excited and misbehaved. The American Way, Dec.
1984, at 42. Speech takes many forms.
106. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
107. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Hammond v. Univer-
sity of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965).
108. Powe, supra note 94, at 278-84.
109. Law, Economic Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHrS, supra note 9, at 134.
110. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Powe, supra note 94, at 278.
111. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1980).
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those-such as Justice Brennan-who now see the states as having a spe-
cial responsibility to defend the rights that federal courts are unwilling to
recognize, may have something powerful to teach us. These essays contain
no discussion on this score. It may be, of course, that the promise of free
speech the Constitution indisputably makes will yield to the market domi-
nance of monopolists. That risk-and it is substantial-makes it all the
more urgent to discuss the tactics of forestalling such an event.
It is surprising that these concerns are not raised in this book because
they were at least acknowledged in an ACLU publication shortly after
Buckley v. Valeo was decided. Joel Gora, then ACLU Associate Legal
Director, analyzed the campaign finance legislation and took account of
"the equality issue-trying to facilitate the whole spectrum of political
viewpoints." '12 There is no hint of concern with this issue anywhere
among these essays. Yet the ACLU regarded Buckley as important when
it was decided, and proclaimed pride that the petitioners included a broad
cross section of political views.'"
On the whole, I suspect civil libertarians applaud the rhetoric of many
of the Court's recent First Amendment decisions. They must, however,
pay serious attention to the closure of public forums to the dissentient
voices of the less affluent. This is not simply a matter of First Amendment
theory in a mass society, but relates vitally to broader support for demo-
cratic rights. The message of the wealthy few who dominate mass speech
is not congenial to democratic rights, and the judicial record of rights-
protection tends to be worst when well-financed and strident voices call
for repression.
III. THE SECURITY OF WHOM, AND FROM WHAT?
Certainly there is no more potent threat to First Amendment doctrine
than the idea that "national security" is a kind of talismanic incantation,
the invocation of which dissolves competing constitutional claims. Coupled
with the idea that property is speech but that speech yields to property,
there is abroad a powerful and potentially fatal danger to liberty of
expression.
Morton Halperin's essay on national security" 4 is not nearly as incisive
as his past discussions. He refers to claims of presidential power, warning
us to be suspicious when the President seeks to arrogate to himself the
112. And What Must Be Done for 1980: A Conversation With Joel Gora, in 4 Civ. LIB. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 20, 25.
113. Inside the Great Campaign Finances Case of 1976, in 4 Civ. LiB. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1977,
at 8.
114. Halperin, supra note 9, at 281.
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right to decide important questions of individual liberty. Yet his discus-
sion-which focuses principally on warrantless wiretaps and prior re-
straint of speech-is all too brief, all too cursory.
I think back to 1967, when the indictment was returned against Dr.
Spock and other antiwar activists. The American Civil Liberties Union
had trouble seeing the prosecution as a civil liberties case. The ACLU
attitude changed sharply over time, as it became clear that claims of exec-
utive prerogative to conduct an undeclared war were inseparable from the
Administration's effort to punish those who dissented from that mistaken
policy. Now we are in the midst of another effort to control the executive
branch as it prepares and wages overt and covert aggression against other
sovereign states, and spends unprecedented billions on ever more sophisti-
cated nuclear armaments.
Morton Halperin knows this to be so, and his knowledge, gained from
experience in and out of government, makes him an observer and com-
mentator without peer. I wish he had spoken to us from his deep knowl-
edge and conviction. He tells us instead that warrantless foreign national
security wiretaps are no longer a great problem, because Congress in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires some sort of a warrant for
such taps. This statute, he says, is "a reasonable attempt to balance pri-
vacy and the protection of national security.""' 5 Would that it were so.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, with its secret court and secret
files and restrictions on open litigation over compliance with its terms and
with the Fourth Amendment, may have been the best one could get from
the Congress, but it has proven to give scant protection to privacy
rights.1 '
Dr. Halperin's analysis of the national security claims that are inter-
posed to restrict public access to government information is more cogent,
though not developed. In Snepp v. United States,"7 the Supreme Court
upheld a contract between a CIA agent and the Agency that created a
fiduciary relationship between the agent and the CIA with respect to in-
formation obtained in the course of employment, and required former
agents to submit their writings to the agency. On this basis, the Court
imposed a constructive trust on royalties from writings not submitted in
accordance with the contract, and approved censorship of the agent's
work.
Seeking to take Snepp to the limit of its logic and beyond, the executive
branch has proposed to "Snepp" thousands, if not millions, of government
employees to prevent leaks of information relating to government policy.
115. Id. at 286.
116. See Kennedy, Our Eroding Constitution, LITIGATION, Winter 1983, at 3.
117. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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The current Administration wants government employees with access to
certain kinds of classified information to sign an adhesion contract of non-
publication as a condition of employment. These contracts, in one pro-
posed form, declare that information acquired by the employee in the
course of her or his service is the "property" of the United States."'
Whatever else one may say of it, the Burger Court has generally upheld
the consistent course of federal decisions forbidding most prior restraint of
expression. In the balance is whether government may make these princi-
ples of the First Amendment irrelevant to a given decision by invoking
ostensibly speech-neutral rules of contract and property law. The idea
that the sovereign owns information concerning matters of public policy,
and that it can assert this ownership right against an individual employee
who holds the information, and against the public's interest in hearing it,
has gained currency in some judicial utterances and executive proposals of
late. Dr. Halperin's contribution-warnings, forebodings, and a short list
of some recent cases-does not do justice to this development.
An analysis of national security and civil liberties ought to begin by
noting the salutary purposes of public debate on the issues of war, peace,
and human survival. Proposals to "nationalize" information in the name
of national security are, after all, overtly designed to still debate on such
questions. The ACLU's history is rich in recognition of the interaction
between foreign and military policy disasters and the curtailment of
speech, beginning with the First World War events so ably summarized
in Professor Chaffee's famous work." 9
While I would have looked for a richer and deeper analysis on this
issue, I am disturbed for another reason by the tone of Dr. Halperin's
comment on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The ACLU has
become wary of the federal courts, fearing that seeking judicial vindication
may in fact produce rulings that cut into yesterday's victories. So it has
turned, and rightly so, to the legislature. There is nothing wrong with
participating in the legislative process, nor perhaps with getting every pos-
sible concession to democratic rights on a given issue and then accepting a
compromise. It is neither necessary nor justifiable, however, to salute these
reluctant concessions as victories for fundamental principle.12 0
And even when things without life giving sound, whether pipe or
harp, except they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be
118. See supra note 4.
119. Z. CHAFFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1948).
120. See Burnham, The Increasing Dissent Within the ACLU, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1984, at
A16, col. 3; Peck, Strange Bedfellows: Spies and Secrets, and the ACLU, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov.
1984, at 28.
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known what it piped or harped? For if the trumpet give an uncer-
tain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? 2'
Debate goes on within the ACLU about the proper allocation of civil
libertarians' resources between courts and Congress, and between the fed-
eral government and the states. Perhaps the authors could have shared
some thoughts on this debate, so that we could better evaluate the wisest
way to battle for rights. I think it best for the ACLU to announce un-
waveringly its commitment to an agenda, and to forebear from endors-
ing-as opposed to acquiescing in-compromises. By adopting such a pol-
icy, the ACLU would seek to keep the scope of debate over democratic
rights broad, waiting and working for the return of a time that "was" and
"can be."1122
IV. SOME OTHER THOUGHTS
Time, space, and the patience of readers and editors permit only the
briefest comment on some remaining essays. The pieces on aliens,1 23 crim-
inal justice, 1 4 prisons, 12' and privacy 12 6 are able and persuasive.
I do wish Aryeh Neier's essay on international human rights 2 " and the
Shapiro-Henderson piece on aliens were more closely tied together. The
immigration of aliens fleeing repressive regimes propped up by United
States intervention and the agenda of international human rights concerns
would benefit from treatment as part of a larger problem: The origin,
nature and function of international legal principles in the protection of
individuals. Only recently has it been generally agreed that individuals,
and not only sovereign states, are subjects and beneficiaries of interna-
tional law. If it is important to develop a justification for recognizing in-
ternational human rights principles under the supremacy clause-and I
121. I Corinthians 14:7-8.
122. These are hard choices. When the ACLU has confronted them in past times, its record has
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of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn from the organization. See Baldwin & Westin, "They Never Stopped
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160.
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203.
125. Bronstein, Criminal Justice: Prison and Penology, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra
note 9, at 221.
126. Bender, Privacy, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 237.
127. Neier, International Human Rights, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 296.
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take it Professor Neier and I agree that it is-then there are some formi-
dable jurisprudential and historical hurdles to overcome. Would that es-
says in this book had begun to map the course of that effort.
A necessary beginning to any such effort would be frank recognition
that the United States' consistent and deliberate departures from the re-
straints on military action contained in both municipal and international
law are profoundly corrosive to the entire notion of a rule of international
law. The Neier and Shapiro-Henderson essays touch upon the violations
of individual rights in the context of recent events in Central America and
the Caribbean, but fail to inquire into the course of lawless American
military conduct that has produced these problems.
"Sexual Justice," by Professors Estrich and Kerr, is the best essay in
this book: well-argued, and grounded in insights about the history and
sociology of sexist oppression. Sexism raises fundamental issues of demo-
cratic rights and challenges fundamental assumptions of the system of cap-
italist social relations. Because it is also an issue upon which political
support can provably be marshalled, I hope the authors will go beyond
analysis and propose a program for action.
I would also welcome clarification of the authors' discussion of Michael
M. v. Superior Court,2 ' in which the Court upheld California's statutory
rape law even though it punished only the male participant in underage
sex. The authors say that "the reality" is that "statutory rape prosecutions
are commonly brought in nonconsensual situations," and that therefore it
was wrong for the dissenters in Michael M. to assume that Michael and
the woman had engaged in the "same act."' 29 For example, their discus-
sion of Michael M. v. Superior Court suggests that there could be a pre-
sumption of male aggression in every prosecution of underage sexual en-
counters. Would the factual basis-if any-for such a presumption justify
new legislation or a shift of the burden of going forward or of persuasion
in a criminal prosecution?
With respect to criminal justice and prisoners' rights, I would not add
much to the excellent articles by David Rudovsky and Alvin Bronstein.
Justice Stevens was recently moved to an angry denunciation of the
Court's majority for having summarily disposed of nineteen cases in the
1981 through 1983 Terms on the basis of petitions filed by wardens and
prosecutors complaining of decisions below in favor of an accused or con-
victed inmate: "The Court must be ever mindful of its primary role as the
protector of the citizen and not the warden or the prosecutor. The Fram-
ers surely feared the latter more than the former."' 30 It is not simply that
128. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
129. Estrich & Kerr, supra note 9, at 115-16.
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the Court is reconsidering the criminal justice jurisprudence of the War-
ren era; it is showing, as Justice Marshall recently remarked in a death
case, a Kafkaesque haste to judgment in doing so. 3 '
One quixotically disposed would compare the present majority to the
Duke of Coffin Castle in James Thurber's The Thirteen Clocks.'32 The
Duke feared the Todal, an agent of the devil sent to punish evildoers for
not doing as much evil as they should. Thus, he rushed about doing ill
toward his fellow creatures with greater vigor.
V. THE WATCHMAN WE HAVE SET AS SENTINEL AND GUARD
He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman what of the night?
Watchman, what of the night?
The watchman said, The morning cometh, and also the night: if
ye will enquire, enquire ye: return, come.'33
Stanley N. Katz, in the essay that concludes this volume, writes that the
task of the next generation of civil libertarians is to expand guaranties of
freedom "within the practical realities of liberal politics."'" 4 "The practi-
cal realities" conjures images of two other periods of the ACLU's history
that might have repaid study in this volume, seeking as it does to project
an agenda for these times. During FDR's first term, the ACLU hotly
debated whether to support federal labor legislation, including the Wag-
ner Act of 1935. This debate focused upon whether the rights granted by
the Act were illusory because labor organizations were required to submit
to NLRB jurisdiction and otherwise risk governmental interference in
their affairs. This was certainly a reasonable position, as demonstrated by
the later history of labor relations legislation, including section 9(h) of
Taft-Hartley. But the debate, as I see it, had less to do with the practical
realities of politics than with a genuine concern to determine the true un-
derlying interest of the American labor movement and take a position that
supported the democratic rights of that movement. 35 The ACLU was
looking beyond rights as an abstraction and into the more significant
question of rights for what purpose, and on whose behalf. Would the Act
strengthen the hand of those who needed access to the forums of speech
131. Dobbert v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 34, 41 n.t (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, J.).
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and dispute resolution, as against those of wealth who wanted to cut off
that access?
A second historical episode-the McCarthy era-also deserved com-
ment. In June 1977, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released 10,000
pages of documents that revealed that five key officers of the ACLU trans-
mitted information concerning ACLU members and activities to FBI offi-
cials. ACLU executive director Aryeh Neier promptly disclosed these con-
tacts to ACLU members and engaged in public discussion concerning
them. As Neier said, "Long before I saw the files maintained by the FBI
on the ACLU, I knew the ACLU record during the 1950's was poor.' 136
A candid evaluation of the ACLU's performance during the 1950's
might help us to plan an agenda and an attitude for the present danger. I
do not advocate ritual repetition of mea culpa: Acceptance of the dominant
liberal ideology concerning the consummate evil of Communism probably
had as much to do with the poor record as anything. But at the least, I
think the ACLU's claim of willingness to lead the struggle to defend en-
dangered liberty requires defending by telling us how they are going to do
better than they did in the 1950's.
If I understand what Professor Katz means by saying the next genera-
tion's tasks will be found "within the practical realities," I answer: That
is not the task of the next generation, and has not been the task of any
generation of liberty's protectors if they were serious about their work.
True, "[w]hen," as Brecht wrote, "there was only injustice and no resis-
tance,"' civil libertarians served as keepers of the flame.
But those were merely waiting times. Waiting for what "was" and
"could be": voices in unison arraigning things as they were and insisting
on the right to be heard in advocacy of fundamental change. The truth of
this assertion is within the historical memory of the ACLU, for it first
raised its voice on behalf of those victimized by World War I and postwar
political persecutions: socialists, union organizers, draft evaders, feminists.
Its best hours, in sum, have been those when it dared to challenge "the
practical realities."
The dangers to democratic rights that now appear, many of which these
authors recognize, have a common theme. The declaration that money is
speech, the nationalization of government information, the insistence on
gender-based role classifications, and the anti-labor decisions of recent
days1 3-all of these look to the constitutionalization where possible, and
the institutionalization where not, of the dominant power of large aggre-
gations of capital in American life. The battle is for a space within which
136. See supra note 122.
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the opposition to this power can grow. It is well to sound the alarm of
danger. It would have been better to analyze the roots of that danger and
to ask whose interests are being served by its most prominent
manifestations.

